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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 
Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion requesting attorney 
fees under Utah Code section 78B-5-826, where Appellee sued to enforce a contract 
containing an attorney fees provision, and the trial court ultimately held that Appellant 
was the prevailing party. This issue was preserved in the trial court in Appellant's 
motion, at R. 1639, and in the trial court's ruling on the attorney fee issue, at R. 1856 and 
R. 1853, etseq. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which we 
review for correctness." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (2008)1: 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that 
prevails in a civil suit based upon any promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when 
the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing allow at least one party to recover attorney fees. 
1
 This section was recently renumbered; since it has not been substantially 
changed, we cite to the current version of the code throughout this brief. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action is based upon a written contract (the "Agreement55), originally entered 
into between H&H Network Services, Inc. ("H&H"), and Appellant Unicity International, 
Inc. ("Unicity55).2 After purchasing all of the outstanding stock of H&H at a bankruptcy 
auction in November 2004, Appellee Roger Hooban asserted that he was a party to the 
Agreement with Unicity. Hooban subsequently filed the complaint in this action in April 
2005, alleging several causes of action against Unicity, including breach of contract, 
conversion, unjust enrichment, breach of good faith and fair dealing, intentional 
interference with economic relationship, and seeking injunctive relief and seeking 
attorney fees. All of Hooban5 s claims were based upon the Agreement. 
In August 2006, Unicity filed a motion for summary judgment on Hooban5s 
claims, arguing that Hooban lacked standing to enforce the Agreement upon which his 
claims were based. Hooban filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment in 
September 2006. In December 2006, the trial court granted Unicity5s motion and denied 
Hooban5 s motion. In granting Unicity5s motion, the trial court held that Hooban lacked 
standing to enforce the Agreement, and that Unicity had properly terminated the 
agreement. 
Unicity then moved to recover its attorney fees, based upon Utah Code section 
2
 The original agreement was actually between H&H and Unicity5s predecessor in 
interest; in order to avoid confusing the relevant issues, however, this brief refers to 
Unicity and all predecessors in interest as "Unicity.55 
2 
78B-5-826 and the attorney fees provision in the Agreement. The motion was filed in 
February 2007, the trial court heard argument in June 2007, and the court ruled on the 
motion in July 2007. The trial court denied Unicity's motion, holding that Hooban was 
not liable for attorney fees since the court had previously held that he was not a party to 
the Agreement. Unicity now appeals that denial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Unicity International, Inc. ("Unicity") is a business engaged in the 
supply and marketing of various high-quality nutritional supplements and personal care 
products. (R. 201.) Unicity markets such products principally through direct selling, 
utilizing a network of independent business owners, commonly referred to as network or 
multi-level marketing. (Id.) As a network marketing company, Unicity enters into 
distributor agreements with independent business owners, also referred to as independent 
distributors. (Id.) Unicity independent distributors may be either individuals or business 
entities. (Id.) In general terms, a Unicity distributor earns monthly commissions based in 
part on his/her own sales activity and in part on the sales activity of his/her downline 
distributors. (R. 200.) 
As part of the Unicity distributor agreement, every Unicity distributor agrees to be 
bound by the terms and conditions of Unicity's Policies and Procedures. (R. 152.) The 
Policies and Procedures contain certain restrictions on the transfer of a distributorship. 
(R. 182-83.) The Policies and Procedures grant Unicity the right to approve or 
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disapprove any distributorship transfer (or, in the case of a distributorship owned by a 
corporation, the transfer of interest in the corporation) and a "right of first offer" allowing 
Unicity to purchase the distributorship prior to any transfer. (R. 183.) Unicity can 
exercise its "right of first offer" to purchase the distributorship any time within ten 
business days after the distributor delivers a bona fide offer in writing to Unicity. (Id.) 
H&H Network Services, Inc. ("H&H") became the licensee of Unicity 
distributorship #120319 (the "Distributorship") in 1994. (R. 199.) H&H entered into a 
distributorship agreement with Unicity (the "Agreement"), and was thus bound by 
Unicity's Policies and Procedures. (R. 152.) At that time, H&H was wholly owned by 
John and Brenda Hargett. (R. 199.) Over the next ten years, H&H developed its own 
downline network of Unicity distributors. (Id.) On or about June 7, 2004, the Hargetts, 
as individuals, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the Western District of Washington. (R. 13, 143.) 
Among the assets in the bankruptcy estate was all of the outstanding stock of 
H&H. (R. 139.) On or about November 19, 2004, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing at 
which the H&H stock was offered by auction to the highest bidder. (R. 135.) At the 
auction, Appellee Roger Hooban offered the winning bid of $32,000, and tendered that 
amount to the Bankruptcy Trustee on or about November 30, 2004. (R. 131, 136-38.) 
Unicity did not receive written notice of Hooban5 s offer to purchase the stock of 
H&H for $32,000 until December 3, 2004, by facsimile transmittal of an Order 
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Authorizing Sale of Stock from Timothy W. Dore, the Bankruptcy Trustee. (R. 126-29, 
198.) H&H did not obtain Unicity's approval to transfer the stock to Hooban, nor did it 
provide Unicity with the requisite "right of first offer" to purchase the Distributorship on 
the same terms of the Hooban offer, as H&H was contractually required to do pursuant to 
Unicity's Policies and Procedures. (Id.) 
On or about December 7, 2004, four days after receiving the notice of the Order 
Authorizing Sale of Stock, Unicity informed H&H and Hooban by certified mail that 
Unicity was exercising its right of first offer, and that it would purchase the 
Distributorship for $32,000.00. (R. 86-87.) Unicity further informed H&H and Hooban 
that H&H no longer held an ownership interest in the Distributorship. (R. 86.) Hooban 
and H&H refused to accept Unicity's exercise of its right to purchase the Distributorship 
for $32,000.00, refused to accept any money from Unicity, aM asserted that Hooban 
should be recognized as the licensee of the Distributorship. (Id., R. 198.) 
Hooban subsequently filed his complaint against Unicity, alleging several claims, 
including breach of contract, conversion, unjust enrichment, breach of good faith and fair 
dealing, and intentional interference with economic relationship, and seeking injunctive 
relief and attorney fees. (R. 1-16.) Each cause of action alleged by Plaintiff Hooban was 
based on the Agreement, which Hooban asserted was enforceable between Unicity and 
himself. (Id) 
Both Unicity and Hooban filed motions for summary judgment on Hooban's 
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claims. (R.l 132-33, 1215-16.) The trial court granted Unicity's motion and denied 
Hooban's motion. (R. 1582-85.) In granting Unicity's motion, the trial court agreed with 
Unicity's argument that Hooban lacked standing to enforce the Agreement. (R. 1584.) 
The trial court further held that "[s]ince all of the claims of [Hooban's] complaint arise 
out of the contract, his action against Unicity must be dismissed." (R. 1583.) 
The Agreement, upon which all of Hooban's claims were based, contains the 
following attorney fees provision: "In the event of a dispute, the prevailing party shall be 
reimbursed attorney's fees and reasonable travel and accommodation costs by the other 
party."3 (R. 150-51.) Based upon this provision, in fact, Hooban's complaint included a 
cause of action seeking attorney fees. (R. 4.) Unicity was ultimately the prevailing party, 
however, and accordingly brought a motion for attorney fees based upon Utah Code 
section 78B-5-826 and the attorney fees provision in the Agreement. (R. 1630-31.) 
Unicity filed its motion to recover attorney fees incurred in this matter on February 
7, 2007. (Id.) On February 26, 2007, Hooban responded to Unicity's motion, arguing 
that because the trial court had held that Hooban was not a party to the Agreement, any 
claim for attorney fees made by Unicity must fail. (R. 1778-1808.) Unicity replied to 
Hooban's opposition on March 8, 2007, (R. 1824-29), and the trial court held a hearing 
on the matter on June 4, 2007. (R. 1841.) 
3
 This attorney fee provision is also included in Unicity's Policies and Procedures 
(R. 147-90), which is incorporated into the Agreement by reference. (R. 152.) 
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On July 19, 20079 the trial court denied Unicity's motion requesting attorney fees. 
(R. 1842-50.) In its ruling, the trial court stated that, based on the court's ruling that 
Hooban lacked standing to enforce the Agreement, "[i]t is clear under the Utah Court of 
Appeals' interpretation of [section 78B-5-826]. . . that Unicity cannot recover attorneys' 
fees pursuant to the statute." (R. 1844.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Under Utah Code section 78B-5-826, Unicity may recover attorney fees incurred 
in successfully defending against Hooban's claims by invalidating Hooban's interest in 
the Agreement. Hooban's claims were entirely based upon the Agreement, which 
contains an attorney fees provision. Because Hooban would have recovered attorney fees 
if his claims had succeeded, under Utah Code section 78B-5-826 he is reciprocally liable 
for Unicity's attorney fees since he was unsuccessful. The Utah Supreme Court 
specifically endorsed this interpretation of section 78B-5-826 in Bilanzich v. Lonettl 
2007 UT 26, 160 P.3d 1041, and it is also consistent with precedent in other jurisdictions. 
The Bilanzich Court laid out a specific framework for analyzing claims for 
attorney fees under Utah Code section 78B-5-826. Unicity has met the two conditions 
required by the Bilanzich framework, and thus may recover attorney fees. The trial court 
erred by effectively requiring a third condition: post-litigation enforceability of the 
agreement. Section 78B-5-826 includes no such requirement, and the Bilanzich Court 
specifically stated that the enforceability of the subject contract was not a requirement of 
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recovering attorney fees. 
The public policy underlying the statute also supports allowing Unicity to recover 
attorney fees. That policy is to "level the playing field" where one party is exposed to the 
risk of attorney fees if it loses, but the other party is not exposed to a corresponding risk. 
This is exactly the position that Unicity finds itself in as a result of the trial court's ruling. 
Reversing the trial court will effectuate the public policy underlying the statute, as well as 
level the playing field between similarly situated plaintiffs and defendants. Additionally, 
reversing the trial court's ruling will allow defendants to choose how to defend contract 
claims, without worrying that certain defenses will result in attorney fees, while others 
will preclude them. 
Finally, while the trial court has discretion under the statute whether to award 
attorney fees, the Supreme Court has said that, in situations like this one, trial courts 
"should award fees liberally" under the statute. Based upon the foregoing, the trial 
court's ruling should be reversed, and Unicity should be able to recover attorney fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Both statutory and case law support Unicity's recovery of attorney fees under 
Utah Code section 78B-5-826. 
The trial court erred in holding that Unicity could not recover attorney fees 
because the Agreement was unenforceable. Unicity5s motion to recover fees was based 
upon Utah Code section 78B-5-826, which allows a court to award attorney fees where 
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the underlying contract has an attorney fee provision. The plain language of the statute 
supports Unicity's recovery of attorney fees. 
The Utah Supreme Court directly addressed this attorney fees issue in Bilanzich v. 
Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 160 P.3d 1041. Bilanzich was issued on March 20, 2007—after the 
parties had briefed Unicity's motion requesting attorney fees, but before both the hearing 
and the trial court's ruling. In Bilanzich, the Supreme Court held that the unenforceability 
of a contract did not preclude the award of attorney fees to a prevailing party on litigation 
based upon the underlying contract. The trial court in this case, however, held that the 
unenforceability of the Agreement barred Unicity's recovery of attorney fees. The trial 
court therefore erred in denying Unicity's motion requesting attorney fees. 
A. Utah Code section 78B-5-826 authorizes the recovery of attorney fees 
where the subject agreement contains an appropriate attorney fees 
provision. 
"Generally, a party is entitled to attorney fees only as provided by contract or 
statute." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine. 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992). Utah Code 
section 78B-5-826 states: 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that 
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, 
written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 
1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney fees. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (2008). According the plain language of the statute, when 
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the contract underlying an action contains an attorney fees provision, and a civil action 
based upon that contract ensues, then the party that prevails on that action may recover 
attorney fees. 
Hooban's claims against Unicity were based entirely upon the Agreement, which 
contains an attorney fees provision. The relevant provision states that "[i]n the event of a 
dispute, the prevailing party shall be reimbursed attorney's fees and reasonable travel and 
accommodation costs by the other party." (R. 150-51.) Roger Hooban sued Unicity, 
claiming to be a party to, and seeking to enforce, the Agreement. (R. 1-16.) Indeed, 
Hooban sought attorney fees pursuant to the Agreement in his complaint. (R. 4.) In the 
resulting litigation, the trial court dismissed Hooban's claims, agreeing with Unicity that 
Hooban did not have standing to enforce the Agreement. (R. 1582-85.) Unicity was 
therefore the prevailing party, and as such, under Utah Code section 78B-5-826 is entitled 
to recover its attorney fees incurred in defending this action. 
The trial court, however, ruled that Unicity could not recover attorney fees 
because, "[b]y finding that Mr. Hooban is not a party to the Agreement, the court in this 
matter precluded MY. Hooban from having any contractual obligation4 to Unicity under 
the Agreement... including the provision for attorneys' fees." (R. 1844 (emphasis 
4
 The trial court's ruling misstates the issue—Hooban's obligation to pay Unicity's 
attorney fees is not a "contractual obligation," it is a statutory obligation under Utah Code 
section 78B-5-826, which is, in turn, based upon the terms of the contract underlying the 
litigation. 
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added).) This ruling is incorrect based upon the plain language of Utah Code section 
78B-5-826, which allows the award of attorney fees when one party prevails on an action 
based upon a contract containing an attorney fees provision; the trial court's ruling should 
therefore be reversed. 
B. The Utah Supreme Court has held Utah Code section 78B-5-826 allows 
a prevailing party to recover attorney fees when the underlying 
contract has been successfully defended as being unenforceable. 
The Utah Supreme Court has specifically upheld the applicability of section 78B-
5-826 where a written agreement was successfully defended as being unenforceable. In 
Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 160 P.3d 1041, the Court awarded attorney fees to a 
party where the underlying agreement was declared unenforceable. Bilanzich thus 
supports Unicity's recovery of attorney fees. 
In Bilanzich, a personal guaranty had been executed by Bilanzich that would, if 
certain conditions were met, be delivered to and be enforceable by Lonetti. At least one 
condition precedent was never met, but the guaranty, which should have been returned to 
Bilanzich, was mistakenly delivered to Lonetti. Bilanzich then sought to have the 
guaranty declared unenforceable for lack of a condition precedent. The trial court 
ultimately ruled in Bilanzich5s favor, holding that the guaranty was unenforceable 
because of the lack of a condition precedent. 
Because the guaranty contained an attorney fees provision, Bilanzich moved to 
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recover attorney fees incurred in prosecuting Bilanzich's declarative action against 
Lonetti. The trial court held, and this Court affirmed, however, that recovery was 
inappropriate because, "a party may not avoid [a] contract and, at the same time, claim the 
benefit of the provision for attorney fees." Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, ^ 8 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that the enforceability of the guaranty 
was not a factor in determining whether a prevailing party could recover attorney fees. 
Rather, the Court held: 
The plain language of Utah Code section [78B-5-826] 
provides that a court may award costs and attorney fees to a 
prevailing party in a civil action if two main conditions are 
met. First, the civil action must be "based upon any 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing." And 
second, "the provisions of the promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing" must "allow at least one party to 
recover attorney fees." 
14 Tj 14 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826). Thus, the Utah Supreme Court 
specifically endorsed section 78B-5-826 as set forth above. Additionally, the Court's two 
conditions make up a useful two-part framework for courts to use to determine whether 
attorney fees are appropriate under the statute. 
Applying the facts of Bilanzich to the new framework, the Supreme Court held 
that the two conditions had been met since the claim in Bilanzich was "based entirely 
upon the personal guaranty," and "the guaranty provides for an award of attorney fees" to 
one of the parties. JcL fflf 15-16. Thus, the Supreme Court held, Bilanzich could recover 
12 
attorney fees under section 78B-5-826, even though the guaranty had been found to be 
unenforceable. 
The Bilanzich decision was recently upheld by the Court in Giusti v. Sterling 
Wentworth Corp.. 2009 UT 2, 201 P.3d 966. In Giusti. the Court noted that "[i]n 
Bilanzich, we held that when a contract creates 'an unequal exposure to the risk of 
contractual liability for attorney fees,' district courts may apply section 78B-5-826 to 
ensure that both parties are subject to the attorney fee provision." Giusti. 2009 UT 2, f^ 
11? 
II. Applying the facts of Hooban v. Unicity to the Bilanzich framework shows 
that Unicity may recover attorney fees. 
Unicity moved to recover attorney fees incurred in defending against Hooban's 
claims based upon Utah Code section 78B-5-826. (R. 1630-31.) The trial court denied 
Unicity's motion, holding that the unenforceability of the Agreement barred enforcement 
of the attorney fees provision, and thus barred any recovery of attorney fees by Unicity. 
(R. 1842-50.) The trial court erred, however, in so holding; applying the facts of this 
case to the Bilanzich framework shows that Unicity should be allowed to recover attorney 
5
 In Giusti, the Court did not award attorney fees to the prevailing party, because 
the relevant provision awarded attorney fees to the "non-defaulting party." The Giusti 
Court held that, because there had been no default, the provision had not been triggered. 
The relevant provision in this case, however, awards attorney fees to the "prevailing 
party," as did the provision in Bilanzich. (R. 150-51.) Accordingly, the holding in Giusti 
is distinguishable from the present facts. 
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fees incurred in defending against Hooban's claims. 
A. Bilanzich requires two factors, both of which have undisputedly been 
met by Unicity. 
The Bilanzich framework has two conditions which, when met, "provide[] that a 
court may award costs and attorney fees to a prevailing party in a civil action." Bilanzich 
If 14. The first prong requires that a party to the litigation assert the contract's 
enforceability. The second prong requires that the contract contain an appropriate 
attorney fees provision. Unicity has undisputedly met both of the required conditions, 
and therefore may recover attorney fees. 
The first condition "requires only that a party to the litigation assert the writing's 
enforceability as basis for recovery." Id. [^ 15. The first condition has been met. 
Hooban's claims against Unicity were based entirely upon the Agreement. Hooban's 
complaint alleged seven causes of action, each of which was based upon the Agreement 
and Unicity's alleged breach thereof. (R. 1-16.) In alleging these claims, Hooban 
asserted the Agreement's enforceability as basis for recovery. This satisfies the first 
condition. 
The second condition required by Bilanzich is that the contract "allow at least one 
party to recover attorney's fees." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826. The Agreement 
provides that "[i]n the event of a dispute, the prevailing party shall be reimbursed 
attorney's fees . . . ." (R. 150-51.) The language of the attorney fee provision is broad, 
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and would have allowed Hooban, had he been the prevailing party, to recover attorney 
fees. This satisfies the second condition. Applying the facts of this case to the Bilanzich 
framework, therefore, clearly shows that Unicity may recover attorney fees as the 
prevailing party under Utah Code section 78B-5-826. 
B. The trial court erred in requiring that the contract be enforceable 
against Hooban post-litigation in order for Unicity to be able to recover 
attorney fees under Utah Code section 78B-5-826. 
The trial court erred in denying Unicity's application for attorney fees because it 
based its decision on its previous holding that Hooban was not a party to the Agreement, 
and therefore "the terms of the agreement, including the prevailing party provision, do not 
apply to him." (R. 1845.) Effectively, the trial court added a third condition to the 
Bilanzich framework: that the contract remain enforceable against the non-prevailing 
party following the conclusion of the civil action. 
In Bilanzich, however, the Supreme Court specifically disavowed the use of the 
enforceability of the underlying contract in determining whether to award attorney fees 
under section 78B-5-826: 
Although the guaranty itself was rendered unenforceable . . . 
the language of the statute focuses on the provisions of the 
writing rather than its legal effect. Under the statute, it is 
immaterial that events outside of the writing rendered the 
guaranty ineffectual because the provisions of the guaranty 
"allow[ed] at least one party to recover attorney's fees." 
Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, j^ 16 (emphasis added). The ultimate enforceability of the 
15 
contract, therefore, is not a factor in determining whether attorney fees may be recovered. 
Rather, the Bilanzich framework "requires only that a party to the litigation assert the 
writing's enforceability as basis for recovery; the statute's plain language does not require 
that the writing actually be enforceable." Id. |^ 15. Hooban asserted the Agreement's 
enforceability as the basis for recovery. In fact, Hooban cited the attorney fees provision 
at issue as the basis for recovery. (R. 4.) Thus, Unicity has met the required conditions in 
order to recover its attorney fees incurred in defending against Hooban's claims. The trial 
court's ruling to the contrary should be reversed. 
III. The policy behind Utah Code section 78B-5-826 supports Unicity's argument 
that it should be able to recover attorney fees incurred in defending against 
Hooban's claims. 
The Bilanzich Court noted that one of the purposes behind Utah Code section 78B-
5-826 was "to remedy the exposure of the parties to uneven litigation risks." Bilanzich, 
2007 UT 26, \ 19 n.7. Specifically, the Court stated, the purpose of the statute was to 
rectify "the inequitable common law result where a party that seeks to enforce a contract 
containing an attorney fees clause has a significant bargaining advantage over a party that 
seeks to invalidate the contract. The former could demand attorney fees if successful, 
while the latter could not." Id. at ^ 18. In order to avoid such situations, the Court noted, 
the statute "seeks to remedy the exposure to uneven litigation risks." Id. at Tf 19 n.7. 
This inequitable situation imprecisely where Unicity finds itself as a result of the 
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trial court's ruling below. It is also the situation that other, similarly situated parties will 
be in if the trial court's ruling is allowed to stand. Had Hooban been successful on his 
claims, he would have been able to recover attorney fees. Because Hooban was 
unsuccessful, however, the trial court held that Unicity was barred from seeking attorney 
fees. 
A similarly situated plaintiff, when suing to enforce an agreement, would have "a 
significant bargaining advantage over a party that seeks to invalidate the contract." Id, 
Effectively, a Hooban-like plaintiff could file a suit knowing that, if he wins, he will be 
able to recover attorney fees based upon the contractual language, but that he will not be 
required to pay the other side's attorney fees if he loses. In such a case, the Hooban-like 
plaintiff would have a significant bargaining advantage in settlement negotiations, 
because a defendant's potential loss would include paying the plaintiffs attorney fees, 
while the defendant could not possibly recoup its own attorney fees if it successfully 
defended the claims. 
That same advantage is plainly apparent in this matter, where Hooban included a 
cause of action for attorney fees based upon the relevant provision in the Agreement, but 
has balked at Unicity's motion for attorney fees based upon section 78B-5-826 and the 
very same provision. Because of the inequity inherent in such one-way fee shifting, the 
Bilanzich Court held that Utah Code section 78B-5-826 allows for the recovery of 
attorney fees by a defendant on a contract enforcement action, whether the contract is 
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defended as being unenforceable or by other means. 
This inequity has also been recognized by other jurisdictions. In California, for 
example, courts have held: 
[T]he prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees even when 
it wins on the grounds that the contract is inapplicable, 
invalid, unenforceable or non-existent, so long as the party 
pursuing the lawsuit would have been entitled to attorney's 
fees had it prevailed. The rationale is that. . . it would be 
inequitable to deny attorney's fees to one who successfully 
defends, simply because the initiating party filed a meritless 
case. 
Rainier Nat. Bank v. Bodily. 232 Cal.App.3d 83, 85-86, 282 Cal.Rptr. 926 (1991) 
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court of Nevada has held that a plaintiff could recover 
attorney fees on a contract that it showed was void by way of rescission. Mackintosh v. 
California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 115 Nev. 393, 405-06, 935 P.2d 1154 (Nev. 1997). 
In Arizona, the Arizona Supreme Court stated: "[Allowing attorney's fees only where 
there is a breach of a valid contract and not where the dispute concerns the validity of the 
contract. . . would be both inequitable and unjust." Marcus v. Fox, 150 Ariz. 333, 336, 
723 P.2d 682 (Ariz. 1986). 
As a final matter, the trial court's ruling in this case establishes an inequitable 
double standard for contract defenses. If the trial court's ruling were to be upheld, certain 
defenses, such as fraud in the inducement, standing, rescission, and mistake, which would 
render the subject agreement unenforceable, would not result in attorney fees for a 
defendant if successful, because the contract would no longer be enforceable. If a 
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defendai it was successful on otl lei defenses, however, such as excuse, performance, 
material breach, frustration of purpose, and impossibility, she would be able to recover 
attorney fees. Thus, in deciding how to defend against a contract claim, a defendant 
would have skewed incentives in deciding how to go about her defense. This result is 
ineqi iitable to defendants. - . 
Had Hooban been successful on his claims, he would have been entitled to 
attorney fees. Unicity successfully defended against Hooban5s contract claims, but the 
trial court held that attorney fees could not be recovered. This result is inequitable and is 
contrary to tl le • pi ibllc policy behii id 1 Jtal 1 Code sectioi 1 78B-5-826. It is especially 
egregious given that Hooban is an attorney, and therefore knew that by filing his 
complaint, which was based entirely upon the Agreement, he was causing Unicity to incur 
attorney fees. Accordingly, the trial court's decisions should be reversed. 
IV. The Utah 11 vi1 iln m IIIM < n • 1 
to award fees liberally under Utah Code section 78B-5-826 to remedy unequal 
exposure to litigation risks. 
Utah Code section. 7813-5-826 allows courts "to exercise discretion in awarding 
attorney fees and costs." Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, % 17; see Utah Code \itii § 78B-5-826 
("A trial court may award costs and attorney fees . . . ." (emphasis added)). Accordingly, 
the Court has directed, "district courts should look to the pdlicies underlying the statute in 
exercising this discretion." Id. As noted oi le ot tl le i i laii i purposes that the I It ah 
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Supreme Court identified as underlying the statute is to level the playing field between 
plaintiffs seeking to enforce a contract and defendants seeking to defend against 
enforcement by invalidating the contract. 
"Consequently," the Bilanzich Court stated, "in order to further the statute's 
purpose, the exposure to the risk of a contractual obligation to pay attorney fees must give 
rise to a corresponding risk of a statutory responsibility to pay fees." Id. f^ 19. Unicity 
was exposed to the risk of an obligation to pay attorney fees to Hooban under the attorney 
fee provision of the Agreement. Consequently, Hooban must bear the corresponding risk 
of a responsibility to pay Unicity's attorney fees under Utah Code section 78B-5-826. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court advised courts that "[i]n exercising their 
discretion, therefore, district courts should award fees liberally under Utah Code section 
[78B-5-826] where pursuing or defending an action results in an unequal exposure to the 
risk of contractual liability for attorney fees." WL (emphasis added). Unicity's "unequal 
exposure" in this cases is precisely the situation the Court described. Because of the 
nature of its defense, Unicity bore an unfair exposure to the risk of paying attorney fees. 
In exercising its discretion, therefore, the trial court should have "award[ed] fees 
liberally" under the statute. Instead, the trial court held that Unicity was precluded from 
recovery attorney fees, because the contract was unenforceable.6 The trial court's 
6
 The trial court did include a brief mention of discretion in its order, stating: "In 
addition, Defendant overlooks the fact that the award of attorney fees, in [the statute], is 
permissive. The court can take into account the very unique circumstances and facts of 
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decision not to allow Unicity to recover fees should therefore be reversed. 
I "ONI! "U IS ION 
Based on the foregoing, Unicity should recover attorney fees incurred in 
successfully defending against Hooban's claims. Unicity therefore respectfully requests 
that the Court of Appeals reverse the trial court's determination that no attorney fees 
could be recovered, .mil iluil (lie i'mirt ot Appeal^  ii^O'id I\K ITM! omul In exercise its 
discretion by awarding Unicity attorney fees under Utah Cpde section 78B-5-826. 
DATED: May 22, 2009 SMITH, CHAPMAN & CAMPBELL 
A Professional Law Corporation 
BY: sQ hh^ ^ ^ 
STWEN C SMITH 
JOHN S. CLIFFORD 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Counterclaimant, and Appellai it 1 Jnicity 
International, Inc. 
each case." (R. 1844.) The trial court clearly based its ruling, however, on its erroneous 
conclusion that, as a matter of law, Unicity could not recover attorney fees, e.g.: "It is 
clear under the Utah Court of Appeals' interpretation of [the statute] and its holding in 
West, that Unicity cannot recover attorneys' fees pursuant to the statu[t]e based upon the 
prevailing party language of the Agreement, regardless of the scope or typicality of that 
language," idL, and " . . . [Mr. Hooban] has never executed the agreement and cannot be 
bound by its terms." (R. 1843.) 
Even if this Court were to determine that the trial court exercised its discretion in 
denying Unicity's motion for attorney fees, the trial court's decision was an abuse of 
discretion, as detailed above. 
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4TH DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUSW 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Roger Hooban, an individual, 
vs. 
Unicity International, Inc., 
Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff 
Defendant 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO TAX COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
CASE NO: 050401109 
DATE: July 17, 2007 
JUDGE: LYNN W DAVIS 
This matter came before the Court on June 4, 2007 for oral arguments on Defendant's 
Motion to Tax Costs and Attorney's Fees. Plaintiff was present by and through counsel, B. Ray 
Zoll. Defendant was present by and through Mssrs. John S. Clifford and Steven C. Smith. 
Argument was entertained and the matter was taken under advisement. The Court, having 
considered the legal arguments and memoranda on file, now issues the following: 
I 
Bat" kjL'j m i in I „,t!i"ii i ' nuc i l t i i V i i 1 l i v i ' i m 
1. The distributorship at issue was owned by H & H Network Services, a corporation. 
The owners of the stock of H & H, filed banlcmptcy and the trustee of their banlauptcy sold their 
stock as part of the banlauptcy administration. Hooban purchased the stock of H & H. The 
distributorship at issue is subject to a provision of the distributorship agreement that grants 
Unicity a right to first offer when any distributorship is sold. Unicity promptly offered to 
purchase the distributorship from H & H and Hooban. 
2. Unicity refused to accept Roger Hooban as a distributor in the distributorship. Unicity 
asserted that Roger Hooban did not properly acquire and is not tjie holder of the distributorship. 
1 
IG50 
3. On April 6, 2005, Mr. Roger Hooban initiated this action against Defendant, Unicity, 
for breach of a distributorship between Unicity and H & H. Unicity is a multi-level marketing 
company. 
4. On January 29, 2007, Judge Anthony W. Schofield entered an order granting summary 
judgment for Unicity ("Order"). The Order dismissed Mr. Hooban5s claims, finding that Mr. 
Hooban, though the owner of H & H, was not a party to the Distributorship Agreement and 
therefore, lacked standing to bring the law suit. 
5. Mr. Hooban never signed the Agreement or a separate distributorship agreement with 
Unicity. 
6. On February 7, 2007, Unicity filed a motion to recover the attorneys' fees it incurred 
in this matter. 
II 
Legal Analysis 
Unicity has made a claim for costs and for attorney's fees. The Court will first address 
the issue of costs. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "costs shall be allowed as of 
course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." Utah R. Civil Proc, Rule 54 
(d)(1). However, as noted by plaintiff, the rules also provide that to seek costs a party must serve 
upon the adverse party within five days after the entry of judgment "a copy of a memorandum of 
the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the actiom and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly stating the items are correct." Id At Rule 54 (d)(2). The rule is clear 
that such a motion must be served within 5 days of judgment. There is discretionary provision 
that would permit an award of costs where the moving party ha^ failed to comply with Rule 54. 
Mr. Hooban claims that Unicity missed the mandatory five day deadline imposed by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is not permitted to seek costs from Mr. Hooban. This court 
rejects plaintiffs argument. 
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Having rejected the timeliness argument, the court must look at the merits. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that costs, as that term is used in Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, umeans those fees which are required to be paid to the court and to 
witnesses, and which the statutes authorize to be included in the judgment." Frampton v. 
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). The Court in Frampton held that 
there is a distinction between necessary litigation expenses and taxable costs. Id. Unicity is 
correct in asserting that the cost of depositions, if verified, is an awardable cost. See Ong Int'l 
(U.S.A.) V 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 461 (Utah 1993). Unicity is entitled to deposition 
costs in the sum of $1,349.20. 
As noted by plaintiff, a substantial portion of Unicity's alleged costs are not those that fit 
the definition provided by the Utah Supreme Court. Plaintiff has petitioned the court to award 
$364.80 for costs of copying case documents, $465.72 for attorney time, filing fees (though, as 
the defendant in this action, the court should question what filing fees Unicity actually incurred) 
and legal support services in California; and $425.93 in Federal Express and facsimile charges. 
None of these expenses were required to be paid to the court on any witnesses. These costs, 
which amount to $1256.45, are per se un-taxable. 
Next the Court will examine Unicity5s bases for an award of attorney's fees. As set forth 
in the Motion, Unicity claims entitlement to its attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code 78-26-
56(1). Unicity argues that Hooban, despite being well aware of the glaring problems with his 
case, kept pursuing his claims. Hooban's claims were frivolous and completely devoid of merit, 
and Unicity is entitled to its attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code 78-26-56(1). 
Utah Code Ann. Provides that in "civil actions the court shall award reasonable attorney's 
fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action of defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith[.]" Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that a claim is without merit if it is "frivolous" or " of little weight or 
importance, having no basis in law or fact." Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P .2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). 
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"[T]he mere fact that an action is meritless does not necessarily mean that the action is also 
brought in bad faith." Still Standing Stable. L.L.C. v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, 9, 122 P .3d 556. 
Unicity argues that Hooban's action was without merit because (1) "Hooban knew that he 
was not a party to the distributorship agreement"; (2) "Hooban knew that he had only purchase 
[sic] the stock of H & H, and knew that he did not have standing to bring a lawsuit based on a 
contract to which he was not a party"; and (3) "Hooban also knew that H & H had breached the 
agreement by refusing to accept Unicity's offer to purchase the distributorship." See Unicity's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Attorneys' Fees, pp. 4-5. 
Unicity also accuses Mr. Hooban's counsel of attempting to "force Unicity to settle" by refusing 
to dismiss the case to show that Mr. Hooban's counsel was aware the claims were without merit. 
Id. at p. 5. 
Neither the December 18, 2006 ruling of Judge Anthony W. Schofield, nor the January 
29, 2007 Order on Unicity's Motion for Summary Judgment and Hooban's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment contain any language, findings or conclusions supporting a claim that the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith. Though briefed, and 
presumably argued, there is no mention of a meritless claim in the ruling or order. The Order of 
Judge Schofield is controlling and must be honored. Admittedly, the Order, but not the ruling, 
does state in paragraph 3 as follows: "Any motions for costs and/or attorney's fees shall be made 
pursuant to Rule 54 (costs), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 73 (attorney's fees), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure." 
Based upon the "Ruling" and the "Order" of Judge Schofield, the court simply finds no 
legal basis for an award of attorney's fees based upon "frivolous, meritless, lack of good faith" 
claim or theory. Judge Schofield simply did not adjudicate this issue. 
Next, the court will address Unicity's claim for attorney's fees under Utah Code 78-27-
56.5. Defendant's arguments are concise, and presented as follows in its Reply Memorandum: 
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Quite obviously, a party who has not been sued under a contract and is not suing 
under a contract is not entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to the contract. 
However, where a party has alleged claims under a contract containing an 
attorneys' fees provision, that party is liable for attorneys' fees should it not 
prevail. Utah Code 78-27-56.5; Carr v. Enoch Smith Company (1989) 781 P.2d 
1292. This is also the law in other jurisdictions. (California: See California 
Civil Code 1717 (stating "In any action on a contract, where the contract 
specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce 
that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing 
party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, 
whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to 
reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs."); Rainer National Bank v. 
Bodily (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 83, 85-85, 282 Cal.Rptr. 926 (stating "Under Civil 
Code section 1717, the prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees even when it 
wins on the grounds that the contract is inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable or 
non-existent, so long as the party pursuing the lawsuit would have been entitled to 
attorney's fees had it prevailed. (Citations omitted.) The rational is that Civil 
Code section 1717 is guided by equitable principles, including mutuality of 
remedy, and it would be inequitable to deny attorney's fees to one who 
successfully defends, simply because the initiating party filed a meritless case." 
(Citations omitted.); Jones v. Drain (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 484, 196 Cal.Rptr. 
827; Nevada: See Mackintosh v. California Federal Savings & Logan Association 
(1977) 113 Nev. 393, 405-406, 935 P.2d 1154 (noting that Florida follows the 
samerule.); Arizona: See A.R.S. 12-341.01; Marcus v. Fox (1986) 150 Ariz. 333, 
723 P.2d 682, 684-685 (stating "By allowing attorney's fees only where there is a 
breach of a valid contract and not where the dispute concerns the validity of the 
contract, the result would be both inequitable and unjust"). 
Awarding attorneys' fees against the party asserting the contract claims 
case makes logical sense, in that a party who asserts claims based on a contract 
should not be permitted to shift gears after being unsuccessful and claim that it 
should not be required to pay attorneys' fees pursuant to the very contract that it 
sought to enforce. To allow a party to try to enforce a contract and then escape 
the attorneys' fees provision contained in that very contract would not be 
equitable. 
Again, the plain language of Utah Code 78-27-56.5 establishes a right to 
attorneys' fees in a case such as this one. The statue provides: 
"A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either 
party that prevails in a civil action based upon any 
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promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed 
after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory 
note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one 
party to recover attorney's fees." (Emphasis added.) 
Whereas it makes sense that the "either party" language in the statute 
should not extend to any party to the lawsuit (as in Anglin and West), the "either 
party" language necessarily recognizes that at least one party in an action based on 
a contract containing an attorneys' fees provision is entitled to an award of 
attorneys' fees. If an action involves a contract containing an attorneys' fees 
provision, one party must prevail, and that party is entitled to attorneys' fees from 
the other party. 
Plaintiff counters these persuasive arguments by noting the Court, in its ruling on 
summary judgment found that "[bjecause Hooban is not a party to the contract, he lacks standing 
to assert any claims against Unicity arising out of the contract. Ruling, December 18, 2006, p.2; 
See also, Minute Entry, January 29, 2007. If Mr. Hooban was not a party to the Agreement, the 
terms of the agreement, including the prevailing party provision, do not apply to him. See 
Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, 100 P.3d 1200 (It is one of the most basic 
principles of contract law that only the parties to the contract can be bound by the contract). 
Plaintiff argues further that Utah Courts have refused to award attorneys' fees where one 
party to the action is not a party to the contract in question even if the action is based on a written 
agreement with prevailing party language. See Anglin v. Contractor Fabrication Machining, 
2001 UT App 341, 37 P.3d 267; West v. Case, 2006 UT App 325, 142 P.3d 576. In fact, in 
Anglin, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the plain meaning of Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56.5 
only applies to the parties to the contract in question "and not any party to the litigation." 
2006 UT App 341 at 10 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that any 
party to the litigation may recover fees so long as one party to the contract has the right to do so 
under contract. Id. At 11. 
The Court of Appeals explained that the intent of the statute is to allow the party in the 
contract in a weaker position to have reciprocal rights to seek attorney's fees to "creat[e] a level 
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playing field between all parties". Id. Certainly, the statute's intent only permits the recovery of 
attorneys' fees by one party to a contract against another party to the contract. If is not applicable 
simply because a contract is the underlying basis for the claim. 
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that there is simply no contract between the parties and Mr. 
Hooban never signed any document containing an attorneys' fees provision. By finding that Mr. 
Hooban is not a party to the Agreement, the court in this matter precluded Mr. Hooban from 
having any contractual obligation to Unicity under the Agreement. Like West, this court 
explicitly found that Mr. Hooban's ownership in the stock of H & H did not give him an interest 
in the Agreement. Therefore, Mr. Hooban is not bound by its terms, including the provision for 
attorneys' fees, especially when Mr. Hooban never signed any such agreement and Unicity has 
failed to produce any such signed document. It is clear under the Utah Court of Appeals' 
interpretation of 78-27-56.5 and its holding in West that Unicity cannot recover attorneys' fees 
pursuant to the statue based on the prevailing party language of the Agreement, regardless of the 
scope or typicality of that language. 
Unicity's argument is persuasive but it relies heavily upon Arizona, Nevada and 
California law. Its reliance of Utah Law, particularly "the plain language" of Utah Code 78-27-
56.5, is misplaced. The court opines that the intent of the statute is to allow the party in the 
contract in a weaker position to have reciprocal rights to seek attorney's fees creates a level 
playing field between all parties. 
In addition, Defendant overlooks the fact that the award of attorney's fees, in 78-27-56.5, 
is permissive. The court can take into account the very unique circumstances and facts of each 
case. The critical language of 78-27-56.5 has also been overlooked by defendant. In order for 
the provision to apply, inter alia, the promissory note, written contract, or other writing must 
have been executed after April 28, 1986 (emphasis added). Black's Law Dictionary p.567 
defines "executed" as follows; 
Executed. Completed; carried into full effect; already done or performed; signed; 
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taking effect immediately; now in existence or in possession; conveying an 
immediate right or possession. Act or course of conduct carried to completion. 
Term imports idea that nothing remains to be dojie. The opposite of executory. 
See also Execution. 
If the agreement has been completed and signed by these parties and Mr. Hooban has 
immediate rights, then he would have standing under the agreement. But he has never executed 
the agreement and cannot be bound by its terms. Judge Schofield found that he lacked standing. 
That is the law of the case and the parties are bound by that rulihg. 
I l l 
Decision 
Defendant's motion for attorney's fees under a "frivolous, lack of good faith, meritless 
claim" theory is not supported by the ruling or order of Judge Schofield. Defendant's motion for 
attorney's fees under 78-27-56.5 is rejected by the court. Defendant's request for costs is granted 
in part. The court will execute the proposed judgment presented by defendant, consistent with 
this ruling. 
Dated this / / day of July 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER HOOBAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UNICITY INTERNATIONAL, INC., 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: 050401109 
DATED: DECEMBER 18, 2006 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
This case is before the court for ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment. Having 
heard oral argument and having considered the memoranda and affidavits filed with respect to 
these motions, I now issue this ruling granting Unicity's motion for summary judgment and 
denying Hooban's motion for summary judgment. 
This is an action brought by Roger Hooban against Unicity, a multi-level marketing 
company. Hooban asserts he acquired an ownership interest in a Unicity distributorship and that 
Unicity refuses to recognize or accept him as a distributor. Unicity counterclaimed asserting that 
Hooban did not properly acquire and is not the holder of the distributorship and thus is not 
obligated to recognize him as a distributor. 
Each of the parties filed a motion for summary judgment. Unicity filed first and asserts 
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that the distributorship at issue was owned by H&H Network Services, Inc. ("H&H"), a 
corporation; that the owners of the stock of H&H, John and Brenda Hargetts, filed bankruptcy 
and that the trustee of their bankruptcy proceeding sold their stock as a part of administering their 
bankruptcy estate; that Hooban purchased the stock of H&H; that the distributorship at issue is 
subject to a provision of the distributorship agreement that grants to Unicity a right to first offer 
when any distributorship is to be sold; and that when it learned that the stock of H&H had been 
sold, Unicity promptly offered to purchase the distributorship from H&H and Hooban. 
There is no genuine dispute as to any of the foregoing facts asserted by Unicity. 
Hooban brought this lawsuit claiming that he owns the distributorship. Unicity claims 
that he does not own the distributorship, but rather that he owns the stock of H&H. As such, 
Unicity claims, he does not have standing to assert the claims which he makes against Unicity. 
Unicity is correct. The legal analysis supplied by Unicity amply demonstrates that Hooban does 
not own the distributorship. Rather he owns stock. The record is clear and undisputed that the 
order signed by the bankruptcy judge which authorized and approved the sale provides that the 
sale is of "100 % of the stock of H&H Network Services, Inc." The stock was sold for $32,000 
to Hooban. He thus purchased stock, not a distributorship agreement. H&H, which now is 
owned by Hooban, owns the distributorship. Yet, H&H is not a party to this lawsuit. Rather, 
Hooban, individually, asserted he owns the distributorship and brought this action against 
Unicity. However, since Hooban only owns stock but not the distributorship, he does not have 
standing to bring his claims against Unicity asserting that Unicity has breached some duty to him 
under the distributorship agreement. There is no dispute to the facts which support this analysis. 
Because Hooban is not a party to the contract, he lacks standing to assert any claims against 
2 
Unicity arising out of the contract. Since all of the claims of his complaint arise out of the 
contract, his action against Unicity must be dismissed. 
Secondly, the distributorship agreement provides many safeguards for Unicity so that it 
cannot be compelled to contract with someone with whom it does not wish to do business. These 
safeguards include the right to first offer, which Unicity exercised but which Hooban refuses to 
recognize. That right provides Unicity the opportunity, whenever a distributor, whether 
voluntarily or involuntarily, transfers its rights under the distributorship agi'eement, to a first offer 
to purchase the distributorship back. In this case the transfer of the stock of H&H by the 
bankruptcy trustee was such a transfer as H&H now was owned by Hooban rather than the 
Hargetts. Unicity had the right to a first offer if it did not wish to engage in business with 
Hooban, who now owned H&H. Unicity properly and timely attempted to exercise that right but 
Hooban refused. Unicity is entitled to purchase the distributorship from Hooban on the terms 
under which he acquired any rights in the distributorship. 
There is no genuine issue as to the foregoing facts and the parties do not significantly 
dispute the facts upon which the foregoing analysis rests. Rather, they disagree as to application 
of the law. Yet, on the foregoing two theories, Unicity's analysis of the law is correct. Hooban 
does not have standing to assert ownership of the distributorship at issue in this case as all he 
acquired was the stock of H&H, not the separate rights in the distributorship, and Hooban was in 
error when he refused to accede to Unicity5s offer to purchase the distributorship. 
I grant Unicity's motion for summary judgment and deny Hooban's cross motion for 
summary judgment. 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, tonicity's counsel is directed to 
3 
prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this j ^ _ day of December, 2006. 
. • • < » N » A 
BY THE COURT: „ ^ » ^ 
ANTHONYlW. SCHOFFfiL^J^GE 
;;^UTArtgp,;" 
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Steven C. Smith 
1800 North Broadway, #200 
Santa Ana, California 92706 
B.RayZoll 
5300 South 360 West, #360 
Murray, Utah 84123 
LORIWOFFINDEN 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
By m!mmi/v\mA/\ 
DeputV Clerk 
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Exhibit C 
APPENDIX B 
The Associate Distributorship 
Application/Agreement 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS m v Distributorship or other disciplinary action, as 
deemed appropriate by Unicity, In the event of any 
inconsistency between the Policies & Procedures 
and any other publication of Unicity, including the 
Compensation Plan and these terms and conditions, 
the Policies & Procedures shall govern. 
1. I am 18 years of age or older and legally competent to 
enter into a contract. 
2 Upon acceptance of this Distributor Agreement by 
Unicity International, Inc. ("Unicity"), I will be an 
independent contractor and licensed distributor 
(hereinafter "Distributor" or "Associate") of Unicity, 
which gives me the right to sell Unicity products 
(the "Products") in accordance with the Unicity 
Compensation Plan (the "Compensation Plan"). This 
Distributor Agreement will be deemed accepted 
by Unicity in its sole discretion when it is entered 
into the Unicity database. Distributor Agreements 
submitted by telephone will be temporarily accepted; 
however, the original Distributor Agreement or a 
facsimile thereof must be received by Unicity within 
thirty (30) days for it to be considered for acceptance. 
3. I have read the Compensation Plan as well as the 
Policies & Procedures for Unicity independent 
Associates (the "Policies & Procedures"). I agree 
to abide by the terms and conditions of each of 
these documents, and I agree that the terms and 
conditions of the Compensation Plan and the Policies 
& Procedures, including revisions, supplements, and 
amendments thereto, be and are incorporated herein 
by this reference. This is an integrated Contract (the 
"Contract") that also includes the Compensation 
Plan and the Policies & Procedures. Other than 
these referenced documents, no other promises, 
representations, guarantees, or agreements of any 
kind shall be valid unless in writing and signed 
by both Unicity and me. I acknowledge that any 
violation of the Contract or any other agreements 
or obligations I may have with Unicity or any of its 
affiliated entities may result in the termination of 
4. I understand that no purchases are necessary 
to become an Associate other than the purchase 
of a Starter Kit, which does not contain any 
commissionable product and is sold to me at cost. 
The purchase of a Starter Kit is optional in some 
jurisdictions. 
5. This Distributor Agreement shall be valid for one 
(1) year from the date of acceptance and is subject 
to a required annual renewal. I acknowledge that 
this Distributor Agreement and the Distributorship 
created hereunder may be terminated by Unicity if 
the Distributor Agreement is not renewed for any 
reason. The Distributorship created hereunder is 
a licensed right that is revocable, and the position 
this Distributorship creates in the Unicity Associate 
Organization and /or database is the property of 
Unicity. 
6. If I wish to terminate this Distributor Agreement, 
I will deliver to Unicity written notification of my 
intent to terminate. My voluntary termination will 
be effective as of the date such notice is received and 
accepted by Unicity. 
7. As a Distributor, I am an independent contractor, 
sometimes referred to as an Associate. I am not an 
employee, partner, agent, franchisee, joint venturer, 
or legal representative of Unicity. I agree that I am 
solely responsible for my compliance with any and 
all laws or regulations related to my business in any 
jurisdiction exercising authority over me, including 
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but not limited to the duty to license my business 
and to collect and pay sales or use tax on retail sales 
and on products I consume (unless Unicity otherwise 
agrees to collect and remit such taxes). I will obey any 
and all federal or local laws, statutes, and regulations 
applicable to my business and me. 
8. Although Unicity or any of its affiliated entities may 
assist me in becoming aware of applicable laws, 
rules, and requirements, the sole responsibility to 
lawfully conduct my independent Unicity business 
in any jurisdiction rests with me. Therefore, I release 
Unicity and any of its affiliated entities and their 
officers, agents, and employees from all liability for 
any of my actions or omissions. I also waive any 
claims or causes of action which I (or others acting in 
my interest) may have occasion to assert respecting 
my status or conduct as an independent Associate or 
Sponsor of Unicity arising out of any of my acts or 
omissions. I agree to indemnify and hold harmless 
Unicity and any of its affiliated organizations for any 
claim, action, or liability asserted arising out of my 
actions, omissions, or representations in sponsoring 
or conducting my independent Unicity business. 
9. This Distributor Agreement allows me to recruit 
prospective Associates of Unicity in the United 
States and its possessions and territories. I may 
sponsor Associates in other countries pursuant to 
the conditions of the Unicity Ambassador Program, 
which is included in the Policies & Procedures, 
10. I understand that only Associates in good standing (as 
such status is determined by Unicity) may Sponsor 
new Associates. Unicity, at its sole discretion, may 
reject this Distributor Agreement without disclosing 
any reason therefore. If this Distributor Agreement 
is not accepted or approved, I release Unicity and 
its officers, agents, advisors, and employees from 
all liability incurred by me or by any other person. I 
waive any associated claim(s) that might be asserted 
, in my interest. 
11. I understand that I am responsible for training and 
supporting any Associates I Sponsor and/or recruit 
under the Compensation Plan. I will perform a bona 
fide supervisory, soliciting, distributive, and/or 
selling function in connection with the sale of Unicity 
products to the ultimate consumer. I also agree to 
train any Associate who I may Sponsor or recruit in 
the performance of these functions. I will maintain 
continuing communication with and supervision over 
my Unicity Associate organization. 
12. I understand and agree that my compensation from 
Unicity is established by the Compensation Plan and 
will consist solely of Personal Rebates, Generational 
Commissions, and/or bonuses relating to the sale 
of or other output derived from in-person sales, 
solicitations, or orders from ultimate consumers, in 
the home or otherwise, rather than in a permanent 
retail establishment. 
13. I agree that I may not alter, repackage, relabel, or 
otherwise change any Unicity product, nor will I 
sell any such product under any name or label other 
than that authorized by Unicity. I further agree that 
I will refrain from producing, selling, and using (for 
the purpose of advertising, promoting, or describing 
Unicity's products) any compensation plan, program, 
writing, recording, or any other materials that have 
not been previously approved or provided by Unicity. 
14. I understand and agree that I may not convey, assign, 
or otherwise transfer any rights arising hereunder 
without the prior written consent of Unicity. Unicity 
may assign the Contract without my consent. 
15. I agree not to use proprietary trade names, 
trademarks, or other property of Unicity without the 
prior written consent of Unicity. 
16. I will make no claims of therapeutic or curative 
properties regarding Unicity products or claims 
involving the Compensation Plan that are not 
contained in official Unicity literature that is 
produced and distributed by Unicity. 
17. Unicity and its affiliated entities have proprietary 
rights to its Associates and lists of Associate names. 
I will not use any Unicity Associate Lists or other 
Unicity contacts to promote the sale or use of any 
products, programs, or services other than those 
offered through Unicity, to any Unicity Associate 
whom I do not personally Sponsor. I further agree 
that I may not hold a beneficial interest in more 
than one Unicity Distributorship except as expressly 
allowed in the Compensation Plan, I will return all 
existing Associate Lists upon request by Unicity or 
upon my termination. 
18. In the event I choose to purchase Unicity Products on 
my credit card or banking debit card, my signature 
on this Distributor Agreement hereby constitutes my 
authorization to process any order I place to those 
accounts and to use this as my "signature on file." 
19. If any provision of this Contract is found to be 
unenforceable or invalid, the validity of the remaining 
provisions shall not be affected. 
20. This Contract shall be governed under the laws of 
the State of Utah. I agree that proper jurisdiction 
and venue shall be in the state and federal courts 
in Salt Lake County or Utah County, Utah. In the 
event of a dispute, the prevailing party shall be 
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reimbursed attorney's fees and reasonable travel and 
accommodation costs by the other party. 
21. I agree that regardless of the form of claim, whether 22. 
in tort, contract, or other, Unicity, its subsidiaries, and 
affiliated companies and their officers, employees, 
and agents shall not be liable for any consequential, 
incidental, special, or punitive damages, including 
lost profits or any claims against Unicity No legal 
action may be brought by either party to this 
Distributor Agreement more than one year after the 
event giving rise to the cause of action has occurred. 
I certify the accuracy of all information provided 
by me in this Distributor Agreement and agree that 
the providing of false or misleading information 
authorizes Unicity, at its election, to declare this 
Distributor Agreement void from its inception. 
This Appendix C is part of and incorporated into the 
Unicity Policies & Procedures. 
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